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THE LIMITS OF AUTONOMY: FORCE-FEEDINGS IN CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND IN PRISONS
The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this 
new right is established: the right to make live and to let die.1
 For perhaps the first time in human history, the definition of death changed in 
the 1970s with the advent of new medical technologies. At one time, death meant 
the cessation of heartbeat, breathing, and brain function. But with the proliferation 
of defibrillators and respirators in hospital wards, able to sustain heartbeat and 
breathing indefinitely, brain function became the means by which death is now 
defined, “with appropriate blurriness.”2
 These medical advancements have created an area of compromised individual 
autonomy. When persons become unconscious patients, their wishes are difficult to 
determine and act upon. In the case of patients who lack capacity to voice their wishes 
concerning medical treatment and decisionmaking, disagreement among family 
members, or between a medical proxy and an institution, can lead to court battles.
 In this article, I will discuss how society and law have grappled with these 
definitions since the 1970s as they pertain to medical autonomy—that is, a person’s 
right to be informed about all medical risks and options and to agree to or deny any 
of them, even if the decision should result in the individual’s death. First, I will 
discuss the history of autonomy as the concept has evolved in medical ethics and the 
courts. Second, in order to illustrate how bodily autonomy is defined—to whom it 
extends and to whom it does not, and in what settings—I examine one medical 
treatment, the use of a feeding tube, and where it can be legally used despite a 
competent individual’s refusal. I will discuss two places where a person can be fed 
against his or her will: a Catholic hospital and a prison.3
 Only since the 1970s has the concept of autonomy been enshrined in medical 
ethics.4 Until that time, care decisions were mostly made by doctors unilaterally.5 But 
a host of changes in medicine and society brought about greater demands for patient 
autonomy.6 New medical technologies, social movements, and the exposure of medical 
atrocities all produced a revolution in medical ethics that granted individuals the 
1. Michel Foucault, 17 March 1976, in “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the Collége 
de France 1975–76, at 239, 241 (Mauro Bertani & Allessandro Fontana et al. eds, David Macey trans., 
Picador 2003).
2. Sherwin B. Nuland, How We Die: Reflections on Life’s Final Chapter 42 (Vintage Books ed. 
1995).
3. See Ann Neumann, The Longest Hunger Strike, Guernica (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.guernicamag.
com/features/the-longest-hunger-strike/.
4. See Jacob Appel, Rethinking Force-Feeding: Legal and Ethical Aspects of Physician Participation in the 
Termination of Hunger Strikes in American Prisons, 26 Pub. Aff. Q. 313, 319 (2012).
5. For a more complete discussion of the tradition of paternalism in medicine, see Jay Katz, The Silent 
World of Doctor and Patient (2002). While the ongoing debate regarding paternalism has 
criticized doctors’ decisionmaking on behalf of patients, recent critics charge that the debate has moved 
too far toward patient autonomy and must be tempered by recognition of doctors’ beneficence. 
6. See Mellar P. Davis et al., Just Whose Autonomy Is It?, 19 J. Clinical Oncology 3787 (2001).
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ability to make medical decisions for themselves.7 Subsequent court cases established 
“right-to-die” jurisprudence.8 Unfortunately, this legal and ethical acceptance of 
autonomy is not universal in the United States.
 The idea that a person should have autonomy in making medical decisions has 
been around for over a century. Several sources cite the Union Pacific Railroad v. 
Botsford decision in 1891 as perhaps one of the earliest legal acknowledgements of the 
concept.9 The case was brought to determine whether the plaintiff, Clara L. 
Botsford, who had been injured while occupying the upper berth in a train sleeping 
car, could be forced to undergo a medical examination, without her consent, upon a 
request made by the defendant railway company three days before trial. The court 
determined that it could not require a medical examination without her consent, 
citing “indelicacy.”10 The court stated, “No right is held more sacred, or is more 
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of the law.”11 Despite Botsford, it 
took another seventy years for this concept of personal autonomy in medical decisions 
to gain traction, both in the courts and the medical community.12
 Jacob Appel, an American author, bioethicist, and social critic, believes that the 
development of new medical technologies in the 1960s and 1970s led to the 
integration of the concept of autonomy into medical ethics.13 While these medical 
advancements—coupled with cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), 9-1-1 lines, and 
the population’s shift to urban living, where an ambulance team could readily reach 
the stricken in their homes or on the street—saved countless lives, they also created 
an area of ethics that was unexplored. Sometimes a patient’s heart and lungs could be 
restarted, but if the victim was without oxygen for a sustained duration of time, the 
amount of brain damage could be irreparable. In these cases, death often became a 
decision: whether or not to pull the proverbial plug. Medical ethics—including the 
adoption of informed consent and patient-autonomy guidelines—developed to meet 
these areas of new and ill-defined practice. In addition to medical advancements, 
social movements (such as those for civil rights and women’s rights), and media 
7. See id. For a discussion of the historical development of informed consent and the philosophical analysis 
of patient autonomy, see Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of 
Informed Consent (1986).
8. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702 (1997).
9. See e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261; William H. Colby, Unplugged: Reclaiming Our Right to Die in 
America 84 (2006); Mara Silver, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of Self-
Starvation, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 631, 640 (2005).
10. See generally Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
11. Id. at 251.
12. See Appel, supra note 4, at 319. 
13. See id. I have also discussed this with Appel in person. Those technologies include respirators, 
defibrillators, feeding tubes, and other medicines or treatments that are increasingly employed during 
the last weeks and months of a terminal patient’s life.
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exposure of gross violations of patients’ rights (including forced sterilization14 and 
infection programs15), spurred a public call for more informed consent from patients. 
These public outcries challenged existing authorities, including the medical 
profession, state governments, and religious institutions, regarding the rights of 
individuals over their own bodies.16
 Law and accepted medical ethics, however, are not always shaped and applied in 
tandem; often laws can be developed only through additional court cases or are 
limited by exceptions that render particular demographic groups outside their 
application. Furthermore, the confounding nature of determining consent for 
patients and prisoners who are—or later become—incompetent is particularly 
challenging.17 This evolution means that today’s medical ethics are only legally 
enforceable once corresponding laws are developed. Enforcement is often subject to 
the ability of patients (including those from minority groups or with limited 
resources) to identify such ethics and demand the compliance of medical practitioners, 
whether individual doctors or institutions. When those patients are subject to 
undesired treatment, their rights are left unrecognized and ignored.
14. From 1909 until 1963, California sterilized 20,000 institutionalized young men and women. See 
Elizabeth Cohen & John Bonifeld, California’s Dark Legacy of Forced Sterilizations, CNN (Mar. 15, 
2002), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/15/health/california-forced-sterilizations/index.html. Texas, 
Oklahoma, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and other states also had forced sterilization programs. 
For a complete discussion of the history of forced sterilizations in the United States, see Mark A. 
Largent, Breeding Contempt: The History of Forced Sterilization in the United States 
(Rutgers Univ. Press 2011).
15. One such long-term program, which caused public outrage, was the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, 
named for the Alabama institute where it took place. In 1972, several newspaper articles brought 
attention to a long-term medical study, initiated in 1932 by the U.S. Public Health Service, that examined 
the health of several hundred men infected with syphilis. Most of the study participants were poor black 
sharecroppers. Although nearly four hundred men were already infected with syphilis, the Public Health 
Service decided to not provide them with medical treatment. By the time the study was brought to light, 
128 men had died. Additionally, it was revealed that the subjects had not been informed of their illness 
or possible treatments for it. The incident forced Congress in 1974 to hold hearings on the study; the 
scandal became a touchstone for patients’ rights advocates. See Henry T. Greely, Our System of Human 
Subjects Protection: Its History and Current Functioning, in Medicine After the Holocaust: From the 
Master Race to the Human Genome and Beyond 186, 187 (Sheldon Rubenfeld ed., 2010).
16. In the wake of Tuskegee, laws enforcing informed consent for research subjects were enacted. See U.S. 
Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: How Tuskegee Changed Research Practices, Ctrs. for 
Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 
2013). For more on the development of informed consent, see Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. 
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford Univ. Press 6th ed. 2008).
17. In the past four decades, legal documents such as advanced directives and living wills have been 
developed to determine patients’ medical desires. Medical or health care proxies, the legal designation 
of a friend or family member as the person responsible for a patient’s decisions should they become 
incapacitated, are now recognized and utilized in most states. While these documents can still be 
contested in court—and routinely are—they represent a legal attempt to truly honor a patient’s right to 
medical autonomy.
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 Regarding the use of feeding tubes, two particular cases established that 
individuals possess a right to refuse life-saving medical treatment:18 Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health19 and Washington v. Glucksberg.20 Yet today, prisoners 
who are on hunger strike are routinely force-fed because courts have failed to apply 
Cruzan and Glucksberg to prisoners.21 In addition, the Catholic Church has thwarted 
patient autonomy when religious ideology is determined to be in conflict with patients’ 
medical decisions.22
 After a car accident in 1983, Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state.23 
Her parents agreed to place her on a feeding tube three weeks after her accident, but 
four years later, they came to the conclusion that their daughter would not recover.24 
The 1990 Cruzan decision by the U.S. Supreme Court established “the sanctity of 
self-determination” and noted Botsford, stating that the “principle that a competent 
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
18. See Silver, supra note 9, at 639. The term “life-saving” (or “life-sustaining” or “life-support”) is problematic 
and misleading in cases when the patient is brain dead, in a persistent vegetative state, or unresponsive. 
In these instances—for example, two recent cases involving a brain dead child in California and an 
unresponsive pregnant woman in Texas—what is being supported or sustained is not the life of the 
individual, but his or her biological functions by artificial means. See Elizabeth Landau, When “Life 
Support” Is Really Death Support”, CNN (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/28/
health/life-support-ethics/index.html?sr=sharebar_twitter.
19. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (“The logical corollary of the doctrine 
of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse 
treatment.”). 
20. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, 
that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment.”).
21. Cruzan and Glucksberg suggest that a person has the autonomy to deny a feeding tube by holding that the 
Due Process Clause may protect the right to refuse unwanted life-saving medical treatment. Although 
recent media coverage of force-feeding prisoners at Guantánamo has perpetuated the idea that force-
feeding is an anamoly, it is well documented that hunger-striking prisoners are routinely force-fed 
throughout the United States. See Christie Thompson, California Hunger Strike Raises Issue of Force-
Feeding on U.S. Soil, ProPublica (July 12, 2013, 1:20 PM), http//www.propublica.org/article/california-
hunger-strike-raises-issue-of-force-feeding-on-u.s.-soil (discussing the case of New York prisoner 
William Coleman); see also NY Court Upholds Force-Feeding of Prison Inmate, Wall St. J. (Jan. 20, 2012, 
3:02 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP0a70a6eb8943416d89121d9e1457fa8e.html; Force-Inmates, 
Migalhas Int’l (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.migalhas.com/mostra_noticia.aspx?cod=148425; Lee 
Davidson, House Approves Amended Inmate Force-Feeding Bill, Salt Lake Trib. (Feb. 27, 2012, 11:30 
PM), http://m.sltrib.com/sltrib/mobile/53577874-90/inmate-allow-bill-feeding.html.csp. 
22. The question of whether medical and religious ethics are jointly formed is indeed an old one. Since Pope 
John Paul II in 2004 changed the definition of “ordinary means” (first expressed by Pope Pius XII in 
1957), bioethicists have debated the morality of feeding tube usage in some patients, thus reapplying 
this old question to new medical technologies—particularly when regarding application of Catholic 
ethics to a pluralistic society, i.e., hospital patients. See Nicole Van Groningen, “Church Autonomy” in 
Medical Ethical Decision Making, Santa Clara Univ. ( July 2008), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/
practicing/focusareas/medical/anh.html.
23. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266. 
24. See Colby, supra note 9, at 89.
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treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”25 The Cruzans were able to have 
their daughter’s feeding tube removed, however, only when they later provided the 
court with “clear and convincing evidence” that Nancy would have wanted that.26 She 
died twelve days after the tube was removed, on December 26, 1990.27
 In the 1997 U.S. Supreme Court case Washington v. Glucksberg, doctors, patients, 
and Compassion & Choices28 sought to establish that the Washington State 
Constitution did not prevent “aid in dying”—that is, a doctor’s legal ability to 
prescribe lethal medication to a terminally ill patient for the patient’s self-
administration. The Court ruled in the state’s favor, holding that “the asserted ‘right’ 
to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest,”29 but 
confirmed the central holding of Cruzan.30 The key Glucksberg passage reads:
The right assumed in Cruzan . . . was not simply deduced from abstract 
concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced 
medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition of protecting the 
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely 
consistent with this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions.31
 Yet both Cruzan and Glucksberg drew the ire of the Catholic Church and deeply 
informed the Church’s hospital policies, ultimately contributing to a disruption in 
the universal application of patient autonomy regarding the use of feeding tubes. The 
Catholic Church’s views on feeding tubes—or patient autonomy and health care 
policy in general—are not small matters; the Church operates more than one-fifth of 
all hospital beds in the United States (over six hundred hospitals), forty-five of which 
25. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
26. Id. at 268–87. 
27. See Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 
1990, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/us/nancy-cruzan-dies-outlived-by-a-
debate-over-the-right-to-die.html.
28. Compassion & Choices describes itself as the largest aid-in-dying advocacy group in the United States. See 
Mary Steiner, Compassion Drives ‘Aid in Dying’ Movement, Compassion & Choices (June 2, 2013, 9:58 
PM), http://www.compassionandchoices.org/2013/06/03/compassion-drives-aid-in-dying-movement/.
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). The U.S. Supreme Court failed to acknowledge 
the plaintiff ’s assertion that patients who seek aid in dying are not suicidal, but instead terminally ill, and 
therefore actively dying. Aid in dying is now legal in four states in the United States: Vermont, Oregon, 
Washington, and Montana. Voters passed the Death with Dignity Act in Oregon in 1994. See Or. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–897 (West 2013). Similar legislation was passed in Washington in 2008. See 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013). The Montana Supreme Court found that the 
state constitution did not prevent doctors from prescribing lethal medication to terminally ill patients in 
2009. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009). In May 2013, the Vermont House and Senate 
both passed the End of Life Choice bill, making it the first state to do so through the legislative process. 
See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5292 (West 2013). The bill, very similar to those in Oregon and 
Washington, allows competent, terminal patients to request a lethal dose of medication from their 
physician that the patient may then self-administer to hasten death. See id. § 5283. 
30. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724. 
31. Id. at 726.
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are the sole providers in their respective regions.32 These hospitals, to varying degrees 
depending on the diligence of the local bishop and compliance of medical staff, are 
operated according to seventy-two Ethical and Religious Directives (ERDs) that are 
written by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and approved 
by the Vatican.33 The ERDs are categorized as “laws” that all Catholics—from the 
pope, to the hospital orderly, to the grandmother in the pews—are required to abide 
by.34 There is a long tradition of dissent among Church leadership and laity; yet it is 
not uncommon for the public, the media, and the Church itself to speak as though it 
has only one voice representing all those whom identify as Catholic. When the 
Church is unable to influence public practice, it often turns to the media and the law 
to exert its ideology. For example, while 98% of all Catholic women use contraception 
at some time in their lives, the Church maintains the position that its affiliates 
(colleges, hospitals, charities, etc.) will not allow contracted insurance companies to 
cover contraception for employees.35 In this and other cases, the Church’s influence 
on health care policy is well documented.36
 Since the decision of Roe v. Wade in 1972, Catholic health care has been a study of 
tensions. While the Vatican and its U.S. contingent, the USCCB, have engaged in 
various campaigns to enforce—by law or social influence—their own unique version 
of medical ethics, the Catholic Health Association, which is pragmatically engaged 
with the day-to-day provision of health care, has become less beholden to the 
leadership’s current ideologies. For instance, the association has consistently given its 
support to the Obama administration’s health care reform act,37 specifically the 
Health and Human Services’ final accommodation for religious organizations opposed 
to contraception38—despite the USCCB’s opposition to the limited scope of the 
32. See Becky Garrison, Playing Catholic Politics with U.S. Healthcare, The Guardian (London) (Dec. 31, 
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/dec/31/catholic-us-healthcare-
abortion; Catholic Health Care and Social Services, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, http://www.
usccb.org/about/media-relations/statistics/health-care-social-service.cfm (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
33. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services (5th ed. 2009). 
34. Id. at 12.
35. See Guttmacher Statistics on Catholic Women’s Contraceptive Use, Guttmacher Inst. (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/02/15/index.html; Dan Mercia, Obama Proposal 
Would Let Religious Groups Opt-Out of Contraception Mandate, CNN (Feb. 1, 2013, 7:48 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/01/31/politics/religion-contraceptive-insurance.
36. See Ann Neumann, The Conscience Clause: It’s Not Just About 770,000 Hospital Employees, The Revealer 
(Feb. 9, 2012, 9:39 PM), http://therevealer.org/archives/10392.
37. In my opinion, “reform” is a hyperbolic portrayal of what the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (also known as “Obamacare”) represents.
38. Exemption and Accommodations in Connection with Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 
C.F.R. § 147.131 (2013); see also Women’s Preventive Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious 
Organizations, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/
Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2013). 
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accommodation.39 As we have seen with abortion, however, the Church has found it 
effective to focus on state-level access and not just federal legislation. While working 
with “pro-life” organizations, the Church has been instrumental in the enactment of 
limitations to a women’s ability to have an abortion across the country, including age 
limits, waiting periods, parental consent requirements, closures of clinics, and the 
regulation of anti-abortion drugs.40 Furthermore, the Church has been very effective 
at pressuring medical practitioners at Catholic hospitals to comply with Church 
doctrine, which fully opposes abortion and many non-abortifacient methods of 
contraception.41 It has also promoted an environment of shame and persecution of 
both abortion providers, seekers, and recipients, as well as for pro-choice legislators.42
 Catholic hospitals have been able to ignore an individual’s right to make personal 
medical treatment decisions through ethical and legal exemptions in the form of 
39. See Barbara Mann Wall, The Role of Catholic Nurses in Women’s Healthcare Policy Disputes: A Historical 
Study, 61 Nursing Outlook 367, 371–72 (2013). 
40. After the expansive Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), created the “undue burden” standard for evaluating government measures 
to limit women’s access to abortions, effectively curtailing women’s rights by eliminating the “fundamental 
rights” language as laid out in Roe. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46. As a result, procedures such as age limits, 
waiting periods, parental-consent requirements, closure of clinics, and the regulation of anti-abortion 
drugs have been deemed constitutional and are now commonplace. See State Policies in Brief: An Overview 
of Abortion Laws, Guttmacher Inst. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_
OAL.pdf (“[Twenty-six] states require a woman seeking an abortion to wait a specified period of 
time . . . . [Thirty-nine] states require some type of parental involvement in a minor’s decision to have an 
abortion.”). While the Catholic Church does not exercise any direct role in creating such laws, its 
influence is felt in the legislative process. See Rishona Fleishman, The Battle Against Reproductive Rights: 
The Impact of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas, 14 Emory 
Int’l L. Rev. 277, 301–04 (2000) (“[W]hile the Church has no state sanctioned role in U.S. politics, it 
does continue to influence legislation.”).
41. See Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical, and Public Policy Implications of Refusal 
Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 469, 484 (2006) (“[T]he growing power of the nation’s Catholic 
hospitals and health care systems creates the largest threat to the availability of a full range of 
reproductive health care services for women.”); Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 
Mercer L. Rev. 1087, 1109 (1996) (stating that the services most likely to be dropped when a hospital 
becomes Catholic are those related to abortion and anti-contraception); Jennifer Templeton Schirmer, 
Physician Assistant as Abortion Provider: Lessons from Vermont, New York, and Montana, 49 Hastings L.J. 
253, 273 (1997) (stating that many Catholic hospitals prohibit their staffs from performing abortions 
and anti-contraceptive procedures, as well as from discussing or dispensing birth control). For an 
overview of the Catholic Church’s reasons for opposing contraception, see Fact Sheet: Contraceptive 
Mandates, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-
life-and-dignity/contraception/fact-sheets/contraceptive-mandates.cfm (last visited Dec. 21, 2013). 
42. Bishops and other members of the Catholic Church have criticized Catholic legislators for their views 
on abortion. See, e.g., James L. Heft, Religion and Politics: The Catholic Contribution, 32 U. Dayton L. 
Rev. 29, 35–36 (2006) (discussing the threats from fellow Catholics and bishops of excommunication to 
then-presidential candidate John Kerry and every Catholic who voted for him in 2004 for Kerry’s pro-
choice position on abortion); see also Ken Lovett, Catholic League: Abortion Plan Will Cost Andrew Cuomo 
Shot at Presidency, N.Y. Daily News (June 4, 2013, 6:23 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/
dailypolitics/2013/06/catholic-league-abortion-plan-will-cost-andrew-cuomo-shot-at-presidency-0 
(explaining how New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s support for abortion rights would cost him a 
chance at the presidency and quoting Catholic League President Bill Donohue’s statement that Cuomo’s 
pro-choice stance is “political suicide”).
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various religious “conscience clauses.”43 Catholic hospitals receive 50% of their 
funding from state and federal sources (in the form of Medicare and Medicaid 
funding, less than 3% of funding is from Catholic sources), and, like “secular” 
hospitals, they serve a pluralistic populace.44 Despite this fact, Catholic hospitals and 
other religious entities have been protected from complying with standard medical 
ethics and practices by a web of conscience clauses that began with the Church 
Amendment in 1973, enacted in the wake of Roe v. Wade.45
 Indeed, conf lict with the Church over the “conscience clause” regarding the 
provision of contraception in President Obama’s health care law has proven most 
telling.46 In essence, the accommodation and existence of such “conscience clauses,” 
when coupled with patients in traumatic situations who are left to make decisions 
without full disclosure of services or meaningful referrals, allow Catholic hospitals to 
be places where the medical choices of the institution—as dictated to administrators, 
doctors, nurses, and patients alike by the Vatican-approved ERDs—supersede the 
choices of the patients they serve. As many have asked, “whose conscience” are the 
laws seeking to protect?47 In practice, these clauses do not protect the religious 
freedom of patients, but instead protect the institution’s chosen ideological stance.
43. See Martha S. Swartz, Conscience Clauses or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal Beliefs Versus Professional 
Responsibilities, 6 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 269 (2006).
44. See Catholics for a Free Choice, Catholic Health Care Update: The Facts About Catholic 
Health Care in the United States 2 (2005), available at http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/
healthcare/documents/2005factsaboutcatholichealthcare.pdf.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 238n, 1395w-22(j)(3)(B), 1396u-2; 48 C.F.R. § 
1609.7001(c)(7) (2012); Jody Feder, Cong. Res. Serv., The History and Effect of Abortion 
Conscience Clause Laws 1–2 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/
crsdocuments/RS2142801142005.pdf.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 18023 (2011) (stating that, under federal law, a health insurance plan or health care 
provider does not need to cover or provide abortion services if it is contrary to its religious or moral 
beliefs); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (exempting religious organizations from having to provide contraception 
coverage in the health insurance plans they offer to their employees, but requiring health insurance 
providers to offer separate contraception coverage to such employees at no additional cost); see also 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 
(U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354) (holding that requiring Hobby Lobby to comply with 45 C.F.R. § 
147.131 would violate its religious beliefs); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 (U.S. Nov. 26, 
2013) (No. 13-356) (holding that “for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise,” 
and therefore the contraception mandate under 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 does not violate plaintiff ’s religious 
freedom); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with the Third Circuit’s 
holding in Conestoga Wood); Zubik v. Sebelius, No. 13-1459 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2013) (order granting 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of 45 C.F.R. § 147.131).
47. Sandhya Bathija, Whose Conscience Counts?, Americans United (Oct. 2009), https://www.au.org/
church-state/october-2009-church-state/featured/whose-conscience-counts; E. Christian Brugger, 
Whose Conscience? Whose Religion? The Enemy Is Partially Us, Zenit (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.zenit.
org/en/articles/whose-conscience-which-religion-the-enemy-is-partially-us; Linda Greenhouse, Whose 
Conscience?, N.Y. Times Opinionator (Feb. 8, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/02/08/whose-conscience/.
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 In 1976, Karen Ann Quinlan was the first person to be the subject of a national 
debate about the removal of life support. Twelve years later the Cruzan case came to 
the courts, and ten years after that came the case of Terri Schiavo.48 Schiavo was a 
Florida woman whose parents unsuccessfully recruited Republican Senators and the 
President to commandeer medical guardianship in 2005, against the rulings of a 
district court49 and the wishes of Schiavo’s husband.50 The Quinlan, Cruzan, and 
Schiavo court cases represent the Catholic Church’s holy trinity of young, white, 
childless women51 removed from feeding tubes or, as “pro-life” activists have 
characterized it, “killed” by a “culture of death” that failed to see the women as 
vulnerable or disabled.52 Cruzan prepared the Church for Schiavo, which was 
publicized by a coalition of Church leaders, associated activists, and politicians in an 
unprecedented way.53
 These cases, particularly Schiavo’s, caused the Church to change the ERDs to 
shift the decision to remove a feeding tube from a patient or the patient’s family to 
the hospital administration when the patient’s wish is “contrary to Catholic moral 
teaching.”54 ERD 58 specifically states:
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water, 
including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for those who cannot 
take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic and presumably 
irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”) who can 
reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care.55
Because Catholic hospitals are protected by the conscience clauses that allow them to 
deviate from general medical ethics, and because vulnerable patients and their 
families often do not know what their options are and look to attending doctors for 
direction, patients are effectively denied an established legal right that would, outside 
48. See Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Abby Goodnough, Supreme Court 
Refuses to Hear the Schiavo Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/03/25/politics/25schiavo.html.
49. See id.
50. See Ann Neumann, The Resurrection of Terri Schiavo, Religion Dispatches (Aug. 10, 2009), http://
www.religiondispatches.org/archive/politics/1747/the_resurrection_of_terri_schiavo/.
51. I submit that it is no coincidence that the three most prominent right-to-die cases were about young, 
white women. The race, age, and gender of these three individuals are significant in that they contributed 
to a particular media interest and attracted the paternal, protective instincts of the Catholic Church. 
Furthermore, because the Church has successfully focused its attention on female bodies of reproductive 
age (regarding abortion and contraception), these three women codified the Church’s “pro-life” platform 
as inclusive of reproductive rights and end-of-life rights.
52. See Bobby Schindler, Terri Schiavo, Her Death Marked a Beginning, WND.com (Mar. 31 2013, 1:56 
PM), http://www.wnd.com/2013/03/terri-schiavo-her-death-marked-a-beginning/.
53. See PBS Newshour: The Schiavo Case Receives Strong Media Coverage (PBS radio broadcast Mar. 24, 
2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june05/schiavo_3-24.html; William H. 
Colby, From Quinlan to Cruzan to Schiavo: What Have We Learned?, 37 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 279 (2006).
54. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 33, at 31.
55. Id. 
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a Catholic institution, be recognized.56 In other words, patients in Catholic hospitals 
have fewer autonomy rights than those in non-Catholic hospitals.
 The comparison of feeding tube usage in Catholic hospitals and prisons is at first 
surprising given the divergent nature of public regard for each institution. Hospitals 
are for healing and Catholic hospitals are held in deserved high regard in the public 
consciousness. Prisons, in contrast, are for the punishment and reform of criminals; 
they are expected to exercise justice and discipline, at a cost to the prisoner, but also, 
arguably, for the benefit of the prisoner and society in general. Yet much can be 
learned from the comparison. The Catholic hospital is not the only place where 
patients’ rights are, in theory and practice, second to those of the managing 
organization; prisoners are routinely denied the right to refuse a feeding tube. To stay 
on a hunger strike long enough for prison officials to contemplate force-feeding is 
not easy; a hunger strike requires physical strength and emotional conviction. But 
the force-feeding of striking prisoners is not rare, although it is rarely publicized.57
 William Coleman, a hunger-striking prisoner in Connecticut, has been routinely 
force-fed since 2008.58 Coleman began his hunger strike on September 17, 2007, two 
weeks after he was incarcerated, to protest his conviction. He says that he is innocent. 
He asserts that his hunger strike is the only remaining way he can exercise his First 
Amendment rights. He also asserts that being force-fed is a violation of his right to 
deny medical treatment and characterizes it as torture. Since he first stopped eating, 
he has not consumed solid food, although he has intermittently taken f luids like 
milk, juice, and Ensure. He has lost more than 106 pounds, four teeth, and has 
suffered untold damage to his internal organs from malnutrition. Just over one year 
after he started his hunger strike, the medical staff sought and received a temporary 
injunction to force-feed Coleman with a tube.59
56. I have spoken about this in various locations and contexts, and invariably am told that a patient who 
wishes to have a tube removed—or not inserted in the first place—should simply go to another, non-
Catholic hospital. Yet, as we have seen with abortion, legal rights are often stif led by lack of information 
and access. Abortion is legal in the United States, yet four states have only one provider. See Tracy 
Connor, 40 Years After Roe v. Wade, More States Restricting Abortion, NBCNews.com (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/21/16624980-40-years-after-roe-v-wade-more-states-
restricting-abortion?lite. Other restrictions on age, waiting periods, and procedural requirements have 
been rampantly enacted in recent years. See Michael Keller & Allison Yarrow, The Geography of Abortion 
Access, The Daily Beast (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/22/the-
geography-of-abortion-access.html. The fact that abortion is legal in the United States does not 
guarantee access to those in Catholic institutions. Incapacitated patients are challenged when they need 
to move to another hospital, just as patients seldom have a choice of which hospital they use, or 
knowledge of what the choice of hospital could mean.
57. See Appel, supra note 4, at 316–20.
58. In January 2012, David McGuire, Coleman’s lawyer at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Connecticut, provided me with Coleman’s mailing address in prison. Since then, Coleman and I have 
regularly corresponded via letters and over the telephone.
59. See Comm’r of Corr. v. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84, 89–90 (Conn. 2012).
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 Coleman and the ACLU sued the State of Connecticut and the Commissioner of 
the Department of Corrections to stop the feedings.60 Coleman wanted to be kept 
comfortable, according to his living will, and to be allowed to die. The court explained 
that it “must determine whether the commissioner’s interests outweigh the incarcerated 
defendant’s common law right to refuse nutrition and liquids without interference.”61 
It ruled that in the interest of preventing “copycat hunger strikes and the duty to 
preserve Coleman’s life, even against his wishes, the feedings were ‘ justified.’”62
 In other similar cases, courts often cite two reasons for force-feeding prisoners: 
prevention of suicide and maintenance of prison order.63 “Curiously absent from any 
state arguments or judicial opinions are the more philosophical notions that a prisoner 
should be forced to live out his sentence as a form of retribution for his crimes.”64 
Instead, courts most often note the state’s interest in the prisoner’s health and well-
being and that of the other prisoners and staff. There is scant evidence that 
hunger-strikers disrupt prisons. Prison wardens who seek permission to force-feed 
prisoners routinely receive it without any proof of disruption.65 Indeed, the 2013 case 
60. See ACLU of Connecticut Legal Docket, ACLU of Conn., https://www.acluct.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/08/UPDATEDLegalDocket.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
61. Coleman, 38 A.3d at 94.
62. Appel, supra note 4, at 313. Despite the categorization of force-feeding as torture by the world’s major 
medical associations, the force-feeding of prisoners continues in the United States, most recently at 
Guantánmo prison. See also World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Tokyo—Guidelines for Physicians 
Concerning Torture (1975), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c18/ 
(stating that a prisoner capable of rational judgment shall not be fed artificially); Carol Rosenberg, AMA 
Opposes Forced Feedings at Guantánamo, Miami Herald (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.
com/2013/04/30/3372407/guantanamo-hunger-strike-holds.html (discussing a letter from Jeremy 
Lazarus, AMA President, to Charles T. Hagel, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, stating that force-feeding detainees 
violates AMA ethical values); Red Cross Chief Blasts U.S. for Force-Feeding Gitmo Inmates, RT (May 15, 
2013, 1:53 PM), http://rt.com/usa/red-cross-guantanamo-maurer-770 (discussing statements made by 
Peter Mauer, President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross); Hunger Games: Critical Health Fears as Gitmo 
Strike Marks Day 100, RT (May 16, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://rt.com/usa/red-cross-guantanamo-
maurer-770 (discussing the force-feeding of prisoners which continues in the United States at Guantánamo 
prison). For more details on Guantánamo, see The Constitution Project, the Report of the 
Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment (2013).
63. For other examples of cases where prisoners’ health and prison order are cited, see Bezio v. Dorsey, 937 
N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep’t 2012) (holding that a state may take affirmative action to prevent the suicide of 
a prisoner in the event of a hunger strike to preserve the state’s interest in protecting the health of 
inmates); Stevenson v. Lanham, 736 A.2d 363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Doe v. United States, 150 
F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing a prison’s responsibility to provide care to preserve life, prevent 
suicide, and maintain prison order); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984) (discussing the potentially 
negative implications of hunger strikes on prison order and the state’s need to force-feed prisoners in 
order to promote the interests in preserving human life and preventing suicide).
64. Silver, supra note 9, at 643.
65. Only three states have laws against force-feeding prisoners: Florida, Georgia, and California (although 
a judge in California ruled that prisoners on hunger strike there in 2013 could be force-fed if they did 
not have a do-not-resuscitate order in writing). See David Ingram & Jane Sutton, Analysis: In Force-
Feeding Detainees, Obama Has Courts on His Side, Reuters (Apr. 26, 2013, 7:53 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/04/26/us-usa-guantanamo-forced-feeding-idUSBRE93P04N20130426. 
Other recent prisoner force-feedings have taken place in Washington, Utah, Illinois, Wisconsin, and 
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in Guantánamo—where a hundred or more of the 166 prisoners there were on 
hunger strike and dozens were force-fed—may show that force-feedings contribute 
to the spread of hunger strikes.
 In contravention of Cruzan and Glucksberg, but in clear keeping with other cases 
throughout the country, the justices in Coleman’s case “reject[ed] the defendant’s 
argument that starving himself to death is not suicide because it yields the same 
result as suicide: self-inflicted death.”66 Because Coleman will only stop his hunger 
strike if his conviction is overturned, and he has no further chance to appeal, the 
court reasoned that Coleman could not justify continuing his hunger strike, and 
concluded that he must be suicidal.67
 Although Coleman has completed his initial sentence, he continues to be held 
because he refuses to sign the sexual offender list, a “choice” that has garnered him 
five more years of incarceration. Regardless, he does not want to leave prison unless 
his sentence of guilt is reconsidered. Coleman continues his hunger strike even 
though the medical staff has interpreted the court decision on force-feeding in 
various ways. Feeding orders seldom designate how or when a prisoner should be fed, 
although they do stipulate that force can be used. Coleman has gone through periods 
of relative physical stability because of regular feedings—sometimes facilitated by a 
semi-permanent tube placed in his right nostril—and periods of physical and mental 
decline without feedings. Coleman’s hunger strike is the longest in the United States 
that I can find record of.
 In both the cases of William Coleman and Nancy Cruzan, the patient, or his or 
her proxy, decided that death—by denial or removal of a feeding tube—was preferable 
to living in his or her current state. Only after years in court was Cruzan’s tube 
removed,68 which portends that, while force-fed prisoners are still considered to be 
New York. See Ann Neumann, Guantánamo Is Not an Anomaly—Prisoners Are Force-Fed in the U.S. 
Every Day, Waging Nonviolence (May 4, 2013), http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/guantanamo-
is-not-an-anomaly-prisoners-in-the-us-are-force-fed-every-day/. For court cases, see McNabb v. Dep’t 
of Corr., 180 P.3d 1257 (Wash. 2008); White v. Suneja, No. 10-cv-332-JPG, 2010 WL 4719663, at *2 
(S.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2010); Bruce Vielmetti, Judge Extends Involuntary Treatment Order for Wold, Journal 
Sentinel (Milwaukee) (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/judge-closes-hearing-
to-public-in-murderforhire-case-q838ui6-134779723.html (discussing the case of Darren Wold); In re 
Lilly, 804 N.W.2d 489 (Wis. 2011); Bezio, 937 N.Y.S.2d 393; Stevenson, 736 A.2d 363. In 2012, Utah 
passed a law in response to the death of hunger-striking prisoner Carlos Umana. See Involuntary 
Feeding and Hydration of Inmates, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16b-101–105 (West 2013); see also Robert 
Gehrke, Utah Inmate’s Starvation Death Spurs Bill on Force-Feeding, Salt Lake Trib. (Feb. 10, 2012, 
10:54 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/53484550-90/inmate-bill-hunger-brown.html.csp.
66. Comm’r of Corr. v. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84, 90 (Conn. 2012).
67. See id. at 100–01.
68. See Nancy Cruzan’s Legacy the Public Is Wiser About the ‘Right to Die’, Phila. Inquirer (Dec. 27, 1990), 
http://articles.philly.com/1990-12-27/news/25923204_1_nancy-cruzan-cruzan-case-budget-bill. 
Although not explicitly, Cruzan established that feeding tube removal at “secular” hospitals is at the 
discretion of patients and their proxies. Yet conscience clauses and the policies of the Catholic Church 
regarding tube removal have infused the decisionmaking process with confusion, misinformation, and 
coercion in Catholic hospitals. See David F. Kelly, Gerard Magill & Henk ten Have, 
Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (2d ed. 2013); Scott Hensley, Obama Pushes 
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without full medical autonomy, perhaps the courts will continue to pressure Catholic 
institutions to comply with standard medical ethics—at least where feeding tube 
usage is concerned.
 The issue of patient autonomy is not just about the patient; it is about doctors as 
well. Those employed by institutions that insist on force-feeding prisoners or patients 
are unable to comply with standard medical ethics and because of coercion, the need 
for job security, isolation from the medical community, or other forces, they are 
prevented from exercising their own conscience regarding the practice. State-
employed prison clinicians must “act in contravention of growing medical consensus 
that such conduct is an ethical violation.”69 At least one commentator has suggested 
that “regulation of professional licensure” may be the “most direct, albeit politically 
challenging, mechanism for halting physician participation.”70
 Culture and law, though, continue to be the driving forces that shape society’s 
position regarding medical autonomy. Perhaps the most compelling argument for 
re-examining the use of feeding tubes is this identification, comparison, and analysis 
of two sites in the United States where a person’s decision to discontinue life-
sustaining71 treatment will not be followed. Such inquiry begs the question of why 
the constitutional right to autonomy in medical treatment decisions arguably stops at 
the Church door or the prison wall.
Hospitals to Honor Patients’ Choices, Compassion & Choices (Apr. 16, 2010, 3:59 PM), http://www.
compassionandchoices.org/2010/04/16/obama-pushes-hospitals-to-honor-patients-choices/.
69. Appel, supra note 4, at 326. 
70. Id. 
71. See supra text accompanying note 18.

